THE THIRD WAY OF GOVERNING THE COMMON POOL RESOURCES EXCEPT PRIVITIZATION AND EXPROPRIATION: ALANYA FISHERS THAT INSPIRED THE NOBEL PRIZE


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OLUKLULU S.

34th International Public Finance Conference, Antalya, Türkiye, 24 - 27 Nisan 2019, ss.77-81 identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Bildiri / Tam Metin Bildiri
  • Doi Numarası: 10.26650/pb/ss10.2019.001.012
  • Basıldığı Şehir: Antalya
  • Basıldığı Ülke: Türkiye
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.77-81
  • Anadolu Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

Common pool resources have two features according to economic classification of goods: it is difficult to exclude the individual from benefiting the good and additional individual reduce the benefit of the other individuals. Individuals that are using the same scarce reasource can realize maximization of their own benefit by maximazing their interest in the present time. The motivation to maximaze the individual interest and difficulty of excluding the individuals from using the good, named tragedy of commons, cause detoriation and not able to transfer to the next genaration. In the assumption of full information, prisoner's dilemma means rational strategies can lead to irrational consequences if there are common pool resources. Thus, the fundemantals of social scineces, political philosophy and ethics are also related to this. One of the policy advice is to exproprate the natural resources like grazing lands, forests and fisheries so that central goverment can control and regulate. An other policy advice, to avoid the tragedy of commons, is to privatizate the common pool resource and establish the individual property rights. "Public-like" and "private-like" institutions can also be succesful of governing the common pool resources. Local Alanya inshore fishing cooperation is a good example of establishing the efficent rules by the participants as an self governed common pool resource.